Pussy Riot: Misguided Martyrs?

It could have been worse: Unsurprisingly, members of the all-female Russian punk band Pussy Riot were jailed this week to two years in custody, but the prosecution had been pushing for three. President Putin may be hoping that his statement in London that the three should not “be punished too harshly,” will be interpreted as benevolent intervention; in reality, the trial has only served to draw media attention back towards Russia’s increasingly autocratic and repressive political system. It is becoming increasingly apparent that free speech is not something that the Russian political elite are keen to hand out.

Across central Asia and the Indian sub-continent in Burma, a country that until recently matched the repression of Russia in its Soviet heyday, the military junta has astonishingly announced a lifting of the press censorship laws. Simultaneously, Wikileaks founder Julian Assange has sought refuge in the Ecuadorian embassy out of fear of extradition to the US, for blowing open American secret diplomatic and military documents. Whatever you say about Assange, and the sex charges he faces in Sweden, the likelihood of him ever emerging from a US jail if he enters are slim. All in all, a big week for free speech; but did Pussy Riot’s protest have any positive effect?

As seems to be consistent with Putin’s approach to the rights of the individual in Russia, he did himself no favours with Pussy Riot. As The Economist has argued “the longer the members of Pussy Riot sat in pre-trial detention, the greater their profile—and their legend—grew at home and abroad.” Since successfully winning a rigged election, Putin (and his regime) have taken several steps against opposition groups, from a law introduced in June upping the fine for street protests to £12,000, to charges being levelled against opposition leader Alexei Navalny for embezzling a state timber company.

The Pussy Riot trial is certainly not an isolated incident therefore. What they have achieved, in quite dramatic fashion, is to bring a fresh dose of infamy to Putin’s regime within the international community. Everyone from Madonna to the Sex Pistols has been queuing up to support them. However such an outspoken international reaction may only play into the regime’s hands: Inconspicuous amongst the regime’s recent laws is one that forces all foreign NGOs in Russia to label themselves ‘foreign agents’; a move indicative of the Cold War ‘foreign conspiracy’ mentality used by the regime to justify its authoritarian existence. International support for the band will only add to this.

This is especially so when the group’s actions and the charges laid against them are considered: The group chose to stage their anti-Putin protest in the Christ the Saviour Cathedral in Moscow, and were found ‘guilty of hooliganism motivated by religious hatred.’ Though highly successful in shocking the regime and bringing a wave of international interest to Russia, the group has received relatively little domestic support. Although recent polling by the Levada Centre shows that many questioned the court’s objectivity and saw the hand of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Kremlin in the prosecution, fewer are ready to support Pussy Riot: 51% held negative or hostile views toward the group’s actions, another 20% were neutral or indifferent (The Economist). The most significant divide is generational; support for the band almost entirely resides with the country’s young – their actions may thus serve to galvanise elderly support for the regime.

Moreover Pussy Riot may have accentuated a trend already occurring under Putin; the collusion of the United Russia party and the Russian Orthodox Church. As The Observer has said, Putin and the Patriarch of Moscow, Kirill I, have “struck a deal”. Putin has returned state support to the church with aid for the restoration of churches destroyed by the communists, and the return of priests to schools and universities. Kirill returns the favour by “making support for the Kremlin kleptomaniacs a quasi-religious duty.”

Pussy Riot performed a valiantly defiant protest against the growing squeeze on civil liberties in Russia and will become martyrs for the cause; however the likelihood is that they have only given ammunition to the reactionary forces in power.

Putin's Russia:Parallels with Al-Assad

The first part in a new series on Russia, its internal politics, and its role in International affairs.

The recent news that a Russian cargo ship, bound for Syria, has turned back after having its insurance to move through British waters revoked by the government is troubling. On board the MV Alead reportedly were three Mi-25 Helicopter Gunships and a new advanced air defence system; the perfect tools to fight a civil war and to deter any potential interference from the outside world. The ship, which was flying the flag of the Dutch-Antilles, is now likely re-sail under the Russian tricolour as a sign of the Putin regime’s determination to support Al-Assad.

In such a case, any attempt by the British authorities to prevent the passage of the ship would be highly prevocational and illegal. Instead the significance of the matter remains with the actions of the Russians: Putin’s determination to defy the western world is indicative of his deep paranoia over internal opposition and of the continuance of his outward-looking KGB Cold-War mentality. Indeed the recent wave of protests that have accompanied Putin’s re-entrance into the Kremlin have provoked a difficult situation for the regime. The propping up of Assad is becoming increasingly reflective of the domestic situation in Russia, as the Oligarchy resorts to intimidation and oppression of opposition forces, fearing a movement reflective of the Arab-spring.

Pro-Democracy protests against Putin's rigged re-election to the Kremlin: New laws against protests are indicative of the police state characteristics of Putin's internal and external policies (more on the protests in Part 2) 

This paranoia is compounded by the paranoia of the ruling elite, who see every attempt to challenge them as part of a wider western-led plot to overthrow them. Luke Harding, in his book Mafia State has estimated that up to 77% of the political elite could have FSB ( (Russia’s post-Soviet Intelligence agency) and/or KGB backgrounds, including 42% of leaders who are already known to have had. Such a makeup goes some way to explaining the action of a regime that has moved to solidify its position internally through oppression, whilst simultaneously remaining belligerent in its diplomacy toward democracies. It is therefore unsurprising that despite the moral-bankruptcy of his position, Putin continues to block UN resolutions towards Syria, considering the immediate parallels that can be drawn between the protests in Syria and the Arab world in general, and the protests against Putin’s recently rigged return to the Kremlin

Aside from explanations centred on the backward and autocratic mentality of Russia’s political elite, and the parallels that can be drawn between Syria’s revolution and Russia’s own internal opposition (more to come in a future article), the regime’s actions can be viewed as an attempt to remain a big game player on the international stage. Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs has stated “my deep conviction is that Russia has not cared about its international image for a long time.” This may be true, to the extent that Russia does not care what the west thinks of it. But Putin is desperate to revive the strength of his Russian state; which means being taken seriously by both internal opposition and the West.

The support of Syria is just one on a list of actions that share inconspicuously the common theme of highlighting the strength and autonomy of Putin’s regime from the West. The murder of the KGB defector Alexander Litvineko by FSB agents in London in 2006, which was likely to have been ordered, or at least endorsed, by Putin, is another such example. In the aftermath of the assassination, the Putin regime refused to give up the supposed killer, Andrei Lugovoi, and even endorsed him for political office. The invasion of Georgia to humiliate the country and its president, Mikheil Saakashvili in 2008, for their pro-Western stance is also indicative of this.

A posed picture as part of Putin's carefully cultivated 'Strongman' image

The message of Russia’s actions in Syria is simple: ‘We don’t need the West and we do as we please.’ But as The Economist has argued, Russian defiance should not be seen as an insurmountable bar to action: It did not prove to be in Kosovo in 1999. The UN Security-Council should thus move to outmanoeuvre Russia, and sideline it from resolutions, particularly if China’s position softens further. My personal suspicion is that Putin does care about Russia’s international image, just as he cares so obviously about his domestic one. Just as he wants to return Russia to great-power status, so too does he want to project an image of strength. The response therefore, should be strength from the West against him; to be ignored in the case of Syria would be a humiliation for Putin both internationally and at home.

Putin’s legitimacy had been quashed in the wake of the election-rigging scandal and his oppression against opposition and his support of dictatorial regimes is reflective of this domestic context. With his regime’s position so morally-bankrupt, western leaders should not allow him the pleasure of playing such a major, and disruptive, role in international relations.

Upcoming:

Part two of this feature will deconstruct Putin’s so called ‘Mafia State’ and assess how Putin’s ascendancy to power has corresponded with the formation of an autocratic oligarchy. Part three will question whether, with the centennial anniversary of the 1917 revolution soon coming into view, popular opposition forces will have the strength to enact a new revolution.