Putin's Russia:Parallels with Al-Assad

The first part in a new series on Russia, its internal politics, and its role in International affairs.

The recent news that a Russian cargo ship, bound for Syria, has turned back after having its insurance to move through British waters revoked by the government is troubling. On board the MV Alead reportedly were three Mi-25 Helicopter Gunships and a new advanced air defence system; the perfect tools to fight a civil war and to deter any potential interference from the outside world. The ship, which was flying the flag of the Dutch-Antilles, is now likely re-sail under the Russian tricolour as a sign of the Putin regime’s determination to support Al-Assad.

In such a case, any attempt by the British authorities to prevent the passage of the ship would be highly prevocational and illegal. Instead the significance of the matter remains with the actions of the Russians: Putin’s determination to defy the western world is indicative of his deep paranoia over internal opposition and of the continuance of his outward-looking KGB Cold-War mentality. Indeed the recent wave of protests that have accompanied Putin’s re-entrance into the Kremlin have provoked a difficult situation for the regime. The propping up of Assad is becoming increasingly reflective of the domestic situation in Russia, as the Oligarchy resorts to intimidation and oppression of opposition forces, fearing a movement reflective of the Arab-spring.

Pro-Democracy protests against Putin's rigged re-election to the Kremlin: New laws against protests are indicative of the police state characteristics of Putin's internal and external policies (more on the protests in Part 2) 

This paranoia is compounded by the paranoia of the ruling elite, who see every attempt to challenge them as part of a wider western-led plot to overthrow them. Luke Harding, in his book Mafia State has estimated that up to 77% of the political elite could have FSB ( (Russia’s post-Soviet Intelligence agency) and/or KGB backgrounds, including 42% of leaders who are already known to have had. Such a makeup goes some way to explaining the action of a regime that has moved to solidify its position internally through oppression, whilst simultaneously remaining belligerent in its diplomacy toward democracies. It is therefore unsurprising that despite the moral-bankruptcy of his position, Putin continues to block UN resolutions towards Syria, considering the immediate parallels that can be drawn between the protests in Syria and the Arab world in general, and the protests against Putin’s recently rigged return to the Kremlin

Aside from explanations centred on the backward and autocratic mentality of Russia’s political elite, and the parallels that can be drawn between Syria’s revolution and Russia’s own internal opposition (more to come in a future article), the regime’s actions can be viewed as an attempt to remain a big game player on the international stage. Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs has stated “my deep conviction is that Russia has not cared about its international image for a long time.” This may be true, to the extent that Russia does not care what the west thinks of it. But Putin is desperate to revive the strength of his Russian state; which means being taken seriously by both internal opposition and the West.

The support of Syria is just one on a list of actions that share inconspicuously the common theme of highlighting the strength and autonomy of Putin’s regime from the West. The murder of the KGB defector Alexander Litvineko by FSB agents in London in 2006, which was likely to have been ordered, or at least endorsed, by Putin, is another such example. In the aftermath of the assassination, the Putin regime refused to give up the supposed killer, Andrei Lugovoi, and even endorsed him for political office. The invasion of Georgia to humiliate the country and its president, Mikheil Saakashvili in 2008, for their pro-Western stance is also indicative of this.

A posed picture as part of Putin's carefully cultivated 'Strongman' image

The message of Russia’s actions in Syria is simple: ‘We don’t need the West and we do as we please.’ But as The Economist has argued, Russian defiance should not be seen as an insurmountable bar to action: It did not prove to be in Kosovo in 1999. The UN Security-Council should thus move to outmanoeuvre Russia, and sideline it from resolutions, particularly if China’s position softens further. My personal suspicion is that Putin does care about Russia’s international image, just as he cares so obviously about his domestic one. Just as he wants to return Russia to great-power status, so too does he want to project an image of strength. The response therefore, should be strength from the West against him; to be ignored in the case of Syria would be a humiliation for Putin both internationally and at home.

Putin’s legitimacy had been quashed in the wake of the election-rigging scandal and his oppression against opposition and his support of dictatorial regimes is reflective of this domestic context. With his regime’s position so morally-bankrupt, western leaders should not allow him the pleasure of playing such a major, and disruptive, role in international relations.

Upcoming:

Part two of this feature will deconstruct Putin’s so called ‘Mafia State’ and assess how Putin’s ascendancy to power has corresponded with the formation of an autocratic oligarchy. Part three will question whether, with the centennial anniversary of the 1917 revolution soon coming into view, popular opposition forces will have the strength to enact a new revolution.

Theocracy to Autocracy: Iran's Sneaky Revolution And Why Its Got Everyone So Twitchy

Much ink has been spilt over Iran in recent months, largely concerning the daunting issue of a nuclear armed Iran. Since Iran's Islamic revolution the west has long considered Iran its cultural and political polar opposite. But where has this rise in tension come from? A quasi revolution is taking place in the Islamic Republic. In its wake it is leaving a less Islamic and a decidedly less Republican Iran. The one man band causing all this kafuffle is the charismatic and unassuming Admadinejad.

The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)  is currently investigating Iranian nuclear facilities, and so far the results look promising. With P5+1 negotiations (UK, US, Germany, France, China and Russia) to take place this week a resolution to the uneasy tension may play out. But why has Iran got everyone so nervous?

Contrary to its stereotype Iran has been gradually shedding its radical garbs since its Islamic revolution against the Shah in 1979. Internally the Supreme Council of Ayatollah's have overtime become increasingly cynical due to the inflexibility of theocratic governance. In the face of a growing sense of foreign economic inadequacy, international pressure to demonstrate political legitimacy and maturity with Israel, in addition to dire bureaucratic gout  have led even radical conservatives to yield to reformist governments. Resulting in recent decades of opening up of multi-party elections, freer media apparatus, and some lack lustre economic horizon planning.

The radical visions of Khomeini's 1979 revolution were curtailed by a secession of liberal reforming governments headed by Khatami and Rafansanji which reduced  political isolation and economic encirclement felt by Tehran. But with Iran's oil revenue propping up an under achieving economy, worsened still by sky high subsidies, the reformist results were agonisingly unimpressive, although admirable. Admadinejad represents a second generation of ideologues that believe Iranian failing's are due to the wavering from Khomeini's radical vision, the liberals have misguided the Surpreme Council off the righteous path. Admadinejad wants to bring back the good ol' radical days of yore, 1979.

Admadinejad, a relative unknown, swooped to power on a wave of military and insidious security service methods. Using underhand and undemocratic methods he regained the municipalities, the parliament and the presidency in 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. Regaining much of the executive and legislative power back from the liberal-reformer camp. Admadinejad's radical ideology is well-grounded in his self-appointed cabinet (average age 49), with military and security services echoing his radical fervour.  So much  so  the conservative Ayatollah's fell into begrudging submission, fearful of this new military heavyweight. Admadinejad marks a departure from theocracy and a shift into a more conventional military-based regime.

There has been a large popular opposition to Admadinejad. Since his election in 2005 the 'Green Wave' has been a mass movement opposing his incompetency to govern. He is renowned for installing likeminded inept ministers, and galvanising political patronage through hand-written letters in response to his peoples pleas, a few quid in an envelope, responding in a Jim'll Fix It fashion, without the fix it.

With Admadinejads election the EU-3 nuclear talks set up by his predecessor collapsed. Admadinejads support relies on fear and the heavy influence of Iranian security and intelligence. Not only does he gain populist support from some Arab supporters and radical elements for his anti-Israeli, anti-west rhetoric, but it also fuels Tehran-Washington tension. This tension - real or not - galvanises his military position, the threat of attack impels his conservative followers to want to reach the nuclear arms threshold quicker - The point at which Israel-US forces would refrain from attacking a nuclear armed state. Obama has told Iran that if it unclenches its fist, it will find an extended hand. Something the liberal forces in Iran advocate strongly, but without avail due to Admadinejads military influence.

It can be hoped that like many authoritarian regimes, incompetent and belligerent management will stifle the production of a working bomb. Incompetency Admadinejad has in abundance. The fear is that if he continues with bumptious rhetoric, bomb or no bomb, Israel may lose their patience. Israel can only rely to a certain extent on its Arrow-2 system and nuclear triad; air, sea and land, as it has practically zero strategic depth. An Israeli premptive attack may act to solidify Tehrans pursuit of nuclear arms. The short-term does not look good for Iran with Israel, in the long-term Admadinejad's current trajectory might spark a regional nuclear arms race, a particularly unstable one.

 Another hope is that the Green Wave movement can move from only being an anti-Admadinejad to an anti system movement, signs of which have been apparent since the dubious 2009 elections. But the broad spectrum of political forces in the Green Wave will need to agree to disagree in order to rid Iran of this charming  sabre rattler and his entourage.